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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________  
 
SMITH, Chief Judge. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a devastating impact on 
the restaurant industry.  Since at least March 2020, the risk of 
virus transmission has discouraged a significant number of 
customers from patronizing restaurants.  And in response to the 
pandemic, state and local government officials have issued 
public health orders restricting how restaurants operate by, 
among other things, restricting their hours of operation, 
imposing strict occupancy limits, and even prohibiting in-
person dining.  Consequently, many restaurants have suffered 
a substantial decrease in business with resulting lost income. 
The three Restaurants in these consolidated appeals each 




its respective Insurer was obligated to provide coverage for 
COVID-19-related losses under an insurance policy.  Each 
Insurer removed its case to federal court invoking diversity 
jurisdiction.  Then, each District Court exercised its discretion 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2201–02, to abstain from hearing the case and ordered the 
matter be remanded to state court.  It is these exercises of 
discretion under the DJA that lie at the heart of the three 
appeals.   
We conclude that the District Courts erred in weighing 
factors relevant to the exercise of discretion under the DJA, and 
therefore will vacate the removal orders and remand for 
renewed consideration of all relevant factors. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Generally, “federal courts have a strict duty to exercise the 
jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.”  
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996); 
see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (federal courts have “virtually 
unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given 
them”).  Declaratory judgment actions implicate an exception 
to this rule.  See Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 
134–35 (3d Cir. 2014).  The DJA provides that “[i]n a case of 
actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the 
United States, . . . may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, 
whether or not further relief is or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2201(a) (emphasis added).  The Supreme Court has long held 




“may”—“confer[s] . . . unique and substantial discretion” upon 
district courts to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction in 
declaratory judgment actions.  Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 
U.S. 277, 286–87 (1995); see also Reifer, 751 F.3d at 139.  In 
other words, a district court may abstain from hearing a 
declaratory judgment action that is properly within the court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
However, a district court’s discretion under the DJA is not 
absolute.  It is “bounded and reviewable.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 
140 (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 
(1942); Wilton, 515 U.S. 277)).  Over the years, we have 
articulated several factors that district courts should consider 
when exercising discretion under the DJA.  Id.  In our most 
comprehensive discussion of these factors, Reifer, we began by 
noting that the “existence or non-existence of pending parallel 
state proceedings [to the declaratory judgment action],” while 
not dispositive, is a factor that “militates significantly” in favor 
of either declining or exercising jurisdiction, respectively.  Id. 
at 144–45.  We then enumerated eight factors that a district 
court should consider “to the extent they are relevant”: 
(1) the likelihood that a federal court declaration 
will resolve the uncertainty of obligation which 
gave rise to the controversy;  
(2) the convenience of the parties; 
(3) the public interest in settlement of the 
uncertainty of obligation; 





(5) a general policy of restraint when the same 
issues are pending in a state court; 
(6) avoidance of duplicative litigation; 
(7) prevention of the use of the declaratory action 
as a method of procedural fencing or as a means 
to provide another forum in a race for res 
judicata; and 
(8) (in the insurance context), an inherent 
conflict of interest between an insurer’s duty to 
defend in a state court and its attempt to 
characterize that suit in federal court as falling 
within the scope of a policy exclusion. 
Id. at 146.   
The eight Reifer factors are not exhaustive.  Id.  We have 
also pointed to “additional guidance” from State Auto 
Insurance Cos. v. Summy, 234 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2000), as 
amended (Jan. 30, 2001), as applicable in the insurance 
context.  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 146–47.  Summy’s additional 
guidance includes the recommendation that “when applicable 
state law is ‘uncertain or undetermined, district courts should 
be particularly reluctant’ to exercise DJA jurisdiction.”  Id. at 
141 (quoting Summy, 234 F.3d at 135).   Further, “[t]he fact 
that district courts are limited to predicting—rather than 
establishing—state law requires ‘serious consideration’ and is 
‘especially important in insurance coverage cases.’”  Id. at 148 
(quoting Summy, 234 F.3d at 135).  Yet, we have cautioned that 
there can be no per se dismissal of insurance declaratory 




equally capable of applying settled state law to a difficult set 
of facts.”  Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (quoting Heritage 
Farms Inc. v. Solebury Twp., 671 F.2d 743, 747 (3d Cir. 
1982)).   
In weighing these factors, “district courts declining 
jurisdiction should be rigorous in ensuring themselves that the 
lack of pending parallel state proceedings is outweighed by 
opposing factors.”  Id. at 144.  With respect to state law claims, 
district courts should “squarely address” the alleged novelty or 
undetermined nature of state law issues.  Id. at 149.  Finally, 
“[t]he weighing of these factors should be articulated in a 
record sufficient to enable our abuse of discretion review.”  Id. 
at 147. 
With that background, we turn to the cases before us. 
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
These three appeals follow a pattern.  Each Restaurant had 
purchased an insurance policy that provided coverage for 
commercial property.  Each policy was an “all risks” policy—
meaning it covered losses unless specifically excluded—and 
contained a virus exclusion.  Each Restaurant filed a complaint, 
styled as a declaratory judgment action, in state court that 
sought a declaration that its Insurer was obligated to cover 
losses arising from the COVID-19 pandemic and the 
associated government orders (or, in one case, solely because 
of the government orders).  Each Insurer removed the case to 
federal district court.  Finally, each District Court, in an order 
on appeal before us, declined to exercise jurisdiction under the 




to state court. 
Below, we focus on the unique aspects of the three 
complaints and summarize each District Court’s stated reasons 
for declining to exercise jurisdiction under the DJA. 
A. Umami 
1. Complaint 
In June 2020, Umami Pittsburgh, LLC filed a complaint 
against Motorists Commercial Mutual Insurance Company1 in 
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania.  The central allegations of the complaint, as 
described in the portion summarizing Umami’s “Claim for 
Recovery,” is that Umami made an insurance claim upon 
Motorists for losses and “damages” caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic and the associated public health orders issued by the 
Governor of Pennsylvania, and that Motorists wrongfully 
denied the claim.  Motorists App’x2 591 (Compl. ¶¶ 30–32). 
Umami’s insurance policy, attached to its complaint, 
provides that coverage was in effect until October 2020.  The 
policy contains a virus exclusion which states that Motorists 
 
1 We refer to Motorists Commercial Mutual Insurance 
Company and Motorists Mutual Insurance Company both 
individually and collectively as “Motorists.” 
2 “Motorists App’x” refers to the appendix filed in consolidated 
appeals 20-2954 (DiAnoia’s) and 20-2958 (Umami).  
“AmGUARD App’x” refers to the appendix filed in appeal 20-




“will not pay for loss or damages caused directly or indirectly 
by . . . [a]ny virus, . . . capable of inducing physical . . . illness 
or disease.”  Motorists App’x 633, 636.  And the virus 
exclusion further provides that “[s]uch loss or damage is 
excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes 
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”  Id. at 633. 
Umami’s complaint is styled as a “Civil Action – 
Complaint Seeking Declaratory Relief.”  Id. at 587.  The 
complaint’s sole count is for “Declaratory Relief – Individual 
Claims.”  Id. at 592.  The count re-alleges that Motorists 
“wrongfully refused to provide coverage” to Umami and that 
this refusal “is a material breach of [the insurance] policy.”  Id. 
at 592 (Compl. ¶¶ 39–40).  The count states that Umami is 
entitled to a declaration that it is covered under the policy and 
asserts that “[a] judgment of this court will determine, 
terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty and 
controversy giving rise to this action.”  Id. at 592–93 (Compl. 
¶¶ 42, 47).  As for the relief requested, Umami seeks only an 
order declaring that it is entitled to coverage under the policy 
and “such other relief as the court deems appropriate.”  Id. at 
593. 
On July 3, 2020, Motorists removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  On July 29, 2020, Umami 
moved to remand the case back to Common Pleas, arguing that 
because the case was only for declaratory relief and only 




to hear the case.3 
2. Remand 
In August 2020, the District Court granted Umami’s motion 
to remand.  The Court first rejected Motorists’s argument that, 
because the complaint “expressly alleges a breach of contract 
claim,” the District Court had no discretion under the DJA to 
decline to hear the case.  Umami Pittsburgh, LLC v. Motorists 
Comm. Mut. Ins. Co., 2020 WL 9209275, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 
Aug. 26, 2020) (quotations omitted).  “Having read the 
Complaint and Amended Complaint, the Court f[ou]nd[] that 
Plaintiff seeks solely declaratory relief.”  Id. 
The Court then turned to the question of discretion under 
the DJA.  In its summary of the potentially relevant factors, the 
District Court quoted heavily from Summy and Reifer but failed 
to discuss the importance of the existence or non-existence of 
parallel state proceedings.  Id. at *1–2.  In a footnote, the Court 
correctly stated that there was no parallel state proceeding.  Id. 
at *2 n.2.  After listing the eight factors articulated in Reifer, 
the Court concluded that the first factor was “relevant and 
determinative” and that it weighed in favor of abstention 
because the COVID-19 pandemic raised “novel business 
insurance coverage issues under Pennsylvania law,” and a 
federal court “would be predicting how Pennsylvania courts 
would decide the COVID-19 coverage issues with little or no 
 
3 The same day it filed its motion to remand, Umami also filed 
an amended complaint in federal court.  The amended 
complaint is nearly identical to the original.  None of the 




persuasive authority from the Pennsylvania state courts.”  Id. 
at *2.   
Motorists appealed the remand order.4 
B. DiAnoia’s 
1. Complaint 
In April 2020, DiAnoia’s Eatery, LLC filed a complaint 
against Motorists Mutual Insurance Company in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.  The 
complaint is nearly identical to Umami’s complaint, with only 
the name of the restaurant and details of the insurance policy 
changed.5  The policy between Motorists and DiAnoia’s was 
to remain in effect until June 2020.  The policy’s virus 
exclusion provides that Motorists “will not pay for loss or 
damage caused by or resulting from any virus, bacterium or 
other microorganism that induces or is capable of inducing 
physical distress, illness or disease.”  Motorists App’x 306. 
On May 29, 2020, Motorists removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.6  On June 16, 2020, 
 
4 The remand order was subsequently amended so that the 
District Court would not be divested of jurisdiction during the 
pendency of the appeal. 
5 Umami and DiAnoia’s were represented by the same counsel 
before the trial courts and before this Court.   
6 Motorists had previously attempted to remove the case on 




DiAnoia’s moved to remand the case back to the Court of 
Common Pleas. 
2. Remand 
In August 2020, the District Court granted the motion to 
remand.  The Court, like the court in Umami, rejected at the 
outset Motorists’s argument that the complaint stated a breach 
of contract claim outside the scope of the DJA.  After 
reiterating that the only relief sought in the complaint was for 
a declaration, the Court reasoned that “Plaintiff is the master of 
its complaint and certainly could have, but chose not to, pursue 
theories for legal relief” and that the mere possibility of 
additional claims “does not negate the Court’s discretion under 
the DJA.”  DiAnoia’s Eatery, LLC v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 
2020 WL 5051459, at *2–3 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2020) (citing 
Greg Prosmushkin, P.C. v. Hanover Ins. Grp., 479 F. Supp. 3d 
143, 149 (W.D. Pa. 2020); Umami, 2020 WL 9209275, at *1). 
While noting that there was no parallel state proceeding, the 
Court concluded that the first, third, fourth, and fifth Reifer 
factors weighed in favor of remand.  Id. at *1, *3–4.  The 
Court’s principal reason for remand was that “Plaintiff’s 
Complaint raises novel insurance coverage issues under 
Pennsylvania law, (i.e., business interruption, civil authority, 
extra expense, contamination, as well as pertinent exclusions 
 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Motorists had not 
averred diversity of citizenship under the correct citizenship 
standard for limited liability companies.  In the alternative, the 





raised by the defense), which are best reserved for the state 
court to resolve in the first instance.”  Id. at *3.  Additionally, 
the Court noted that insurance is a “highly regulated industry,” 
“with policy language and premium rates being approved by 
the Pennsylvania Insurance Department,” and that the public 
health restrictions impacting DiAnoia’s “were issued by state 
and local authorities.”  Id. at *4. 
With respect to other Reifer factors, the District Court 
excerpted the reasoning of the district courts in Umami and 
Greg Prosmushkin.  Id. at *3.  These excerpts included the 
observation that “[i]nsurance liability related to the COVID-19 
pandemic is likely to be the subject of a significant number of 
cases in Pennsylvania state court.”  Id. at *4 (quoting Greg 
Prosmushkin, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 151).  The Court did not 
specify how “the availability and relative convenience of other 
remedies,” Reifer’s fourth factor, weighed in favor of remand. 
Motorists appealed the remand order.7   
C. INC 
1. Complaint 
In May 2020, Mark Daniel Hospitality LLC d/b/a INC 
 
7 Motorists also moved for reconsideration to request that the 
District Court retain jurisdiction during this appeal.  The Court 
denied the motion as moot because it had instructed the Clerk 
of Court to not immediately transmit the remand order to the 





(short for Ingredients-n-Craft) filed a complaint against 
AmGUARD Insurance Company in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County.  Unlike Umami and 
DiAnoia’s, INC does not allege in its complaint that it has 
made a claim for COVID-19-related losses and that its insurer 
has denied the claim.  Rather, INC alleges that insurers like 
AmGUARD have routinely denied coverage for similar 
business interruption losses.  Also unlike Umami and 
DiAnoia’s, INC alleges that it is the government orders that 
“physically impact[]” its business, not the virus that causes 
COVID-19.  AmGUARD App’x 24 (Compl. ¶ 21); see also id. 
(¶ 20) (“These limitations and closures of Plaintiff’s business 
are the result of the Orders. To Plaintiff’s knowledge, at no 
time has any employee or patron of Plaintiff been diagnosed 
with COVID-19.”). 
INC’s policy was effective through November 2020.  The 
language of the virus exclusion in INC’s policy—“We will not 
pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any 
[virus] . . . . regardless of any other cause or event that 
contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss”—is 
identical to the exclusion in Umami’s policy with Motorists. 
INC’s complaint is styled as a “Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief” and contains one count titled “Declaratory Judgment.”  
AmGUARD App’x 21, 24.  INC seeks a declaration that 
“AmGUARD is obligated to provide coverage to Plaintiff for 
business interruption and extra expense losses from the closure 
of its business as a result of the Orders.”  Id. at 26 (wherefore 
cl.).  INC explicitly disclaims that it seeks “a determination of 
whether the Coronavirus was present in its business, the 




requested declaratory relief.”   Id. at 25 (Compl. ¶ 28).  As part 
of this requested relief, INC seeks a declaration that 
“[a]pplication of the virus exclusion in the Policy to Plaintiff’s 
losses is void as against public policy.”  Id. at 26 (wherefore 
cl., para. g.) 
In June 2020, AmGUARD removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey on the basis 
of diversity jurisdiction.  INC moved to remand the case to the 
Superior Court on two grounds: 1) that AmGUARD had failed 
to establish that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and 2) that the District Court “should 
exercise its discretion to not hear this declaratory judgment 
action involving solely undecided state law insurance issues.”  
AmGUARD App’x 42 (INC Motion to Remand). 
2. Remand 
In October 2020, the District Court granted INC’s motion 
and remanded the case to state court.  See Mark Daniel 
Hospitality, LLC v. AmGUARD Ins. Co. (INC), 495 F. Supp. 
3d 328 (D.N.J. 2020).  The Court did not decide the amount-
in-controversy issue, explicitly noting that it was instead 
remanding because it declined to exercise jurisdiction under 
the DJA.  Id. at 332 n.4.  It also prefaced its analysis of the 
discretionary DJA factors by noting that “[i]mportantly, it is 
undisputed, here, that Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief 
under the DJA and asserts no other independent legal claims in 
its Complaint.”  Id. at 333. 
The District Court determined that the third and fifth Reifer 




at 334.  As to the third factor—public interest—INC’s 
complaint “present[ed] novel and important issues of state 
insurance law,” including whether the virus exclusion would 
apply to the asserted losses and whether the virus exclusion 
was void as against public policy.  Id. at 335.  “As such, one of 
the key issues in this case is whether . . . . a state government 
order, which required partial closure of businesses, constitutes 
‘loss or damage caused directly or indirectly’ by a virus.”  Id.  
The Court reasoned that an answer to that question would 
require “circumstance-specific determinations that would be 
made with relatively undetermined state law and implications 
of important state public policy.”  Id. at 335–36 (cleaned up) 
(quoting Venezie Sporting Goods, LLC v. Allied Ins. Co. of 
Am., No. 2:20-cv-01066, 2020 WL 5651598, at *4 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 23, 2020)). 
As to the fifth factor—“a general policy of restraint when 
the same issues are pending in state court”—the District Court 
noted that “[a] significant number of cases related to insurance 
coverage for business interruption based on COVID-19 
closures are pending across the country, including in the New 
Jersey state courts.”  Id. at 336.  Furthermore, “the law on this 
issue remain[ed] unsettled” because “as one New Jersey state 
court judge recently observed in denying a motion to dismiss a 
similar state court action, ‘there is limited legal authority in the 
State of New Jersey addressing this issue.’”  Id. (quoting 
Optical Servs. USA/JCI v. Franklin Mut. Ins. Co., No. BER-L-
3681-20, 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1782, at *24 (N.J. 




AmGUARD appealed the remand order.8 
III. JURISDICTION 
“Although courts often refer to a court’s ‘jurisdiction’ 
under the DJA, the statute is not a jurisdictional grant.”  Kelly 
v. Maxum Specialty Ins. Grp., 868 F.3d 274, 281 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2017).  Here, Insurers invoked diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction as the basis for removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332(a) and 1441(a).  “A district court’s discretionary 
remand in a declaratory judgment action is a final decision that 
is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Kelly, 868 F.3d at 280 
(citing Reifer, 751 F.3d at 133). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Insurers raise two arguments.  First, Insurers argue that the 
District Courts did not have discretion under the DJA to 
decline to exercise jurisdiction because Restaurants’ 
complaints are for legal relief that is merely “masquerading” 
as declaratory relief.  We review de novo the District Courts’ 
determination that the DJA applied.  See Reifer, 751 F.3d at 
134 n.3 (citing Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2000)).  Second, Insurers argue that the District Courts 
erred by declining to exercise jurisdiction.  We review such 
decisions for abuse of discretion.  Id. at 137–39. 
We will address each argument in turn.  We agree with 
Restaurants that the DJA applies and that the District Courts 
 
8 The remand order was subsequently amended so that the 
District Court would not be divested of jurisdiction during the 




did have discretion to abstain.  However, we ultimately 
conclude that each of the District Courts either misinterpreted 
some of the non-exhaustive factors that our own Court has 
stated should be considered, did not squarely address the 
alleged novelty of state law issues, or did not create a record 
sufficient to permit thoughtful abuse of discretion review. 
A. Applicability of the DJA 
Insurers contend that the District Courts had no discretion 
under the DJA to abstain because the complaints, styled as 
declaratory judgment actions, did not really seek declaratory 
relief.  The primary difficulty with this argument is that 
Insurers are unable to identify a case—nor have we found 
one—in which our Court determined that a self-styled 
declaratory judgment action was something other than a 
genuine declaratory judgment action for purposes of the DJA.  
Insurers instead rely heavily upon one line in our Reifer 
opinion in which we suggested that “[i]t may, in some 
circumstances, be possible for a party’s claim for legal relief to 
masquerade as a declaratory judgment, improperly activating 
discretionary jurisdiction.”  751 F.3d at 137.  But in Reifer we 
held the DJA did apply, and we affirmed the district court’s 
order declining to exercise jurisdiction.  Id. at 150.  Thus 
Insurers, while relying on Reifer’s “masquerade” phrase, 
attempt to distinguish the instant complaints from the one at 
issue in Reifer.  A brief summary of that case will help illustrate 
how Insurers’ distinctions are immaterial. 
Reifer involved a client who was grievously ill-served by 
her Pennsylvania attorney.  751 F.3d at 132.  The attorney, as 




the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, carried “claims-made” legal 
malpractice insurance.  Id.  But when the client initiated a legal 
malpractice proceeding against the attorney in state court, the 
attorney failed to timely inform his insurer of the action.  Id.  
The insurer, predictably, declined to defend or indemnify the 
attorney.  Id.  A jury awarded the client over $4 million in 
damages in a suit against her attorney, at which point the 
attorney assigned any rights he had against his insurer to the 
client.  Id.  The client then filed a declaratory judgment action 
in state court seeking a declaration that the insurer “must pay” 
the earlier judgment because “under Pennsylvania case law and 
Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4(c), [insurer] 
was required to show it was prejudiced by [attorney]’s failure 
to notify it of her claim.”  Id.  The insurer removed the case to 
federal court, but the district court declined to exercise 
jurisdiction under the DJA.  Id. at 132–33. 
 Our Court affirmed the district court’s order declining to 
exercise jurisdiction.  Id. at 150.  In so doing, we rejected the 
insurer’s argument that “although [client]’s claim was couched 
in terms of a declaratory judgment, it was in reality a suit which 
sought a judgment compelling [insurer] to pay money 
damages.”  Id. at 135.  The insurer had emphasized that 
“[b]ecause [attorney]’s liability had already been established, 
the declaratory judgment action was not prospective” and 
suggested that there “is no meaningful difference between a 
complaint seeking a declaration that a defendant ‘must pay’ 
damages and a complaint seeking to recover damages.”  Id.  In 
rejecting that argument, we concluded that the words “must 
pay” did not change the fact that the requested relief was a 
declaration and the district court “was not being asked to award 




been awarded in state court.”  Id. at 136.  “Moreover,” we held, 
the fact that “additional recovery would likely flow to [client] 
as a result of a declaration in her favor does not preclude 
applicability of the DJA” because the text of the statute makes 
clear that a court “‘may’ grant declaratory judgments ‘whether 
or not further relief is or could be sought.’”  Id. (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2201(a)).   
Turning back to the instant appeals, Motorists suggests that 
Umami and DiAnoia’s both “stated a breach-of-contract claim 
under Pennsylvania law” by alleging that “they were entitled 
to ‘coverage’ — i.e., money — for their ‘losses, damages, and 
expenses,’ and ‘entitled to recover’ those expenses from 
Motorists.”  Motorists Br. 17, 19 (quoting Motorists App’x 59–
60 (DiAnoia’s Compl. ¶ 38, wherefore cl.)).  These isolated 
phrases are as inconsequential as the phrase “must pay” in 
Reifer.  The Restaurants explicitly seek only an order entering 
a declaration.  Their requested relief does not include damages 
or anything other than a declaration, and any statements that 
Restaurants incurred “damages” from COVID-19 do not 
change that fact.  Putting a finer point on it, nowhere does any 
Restaurant request that a Court issue a monetary judgment or 
injunction that would be enforceable by attachment, lien, or 
threat of contempt if an Insurer disobeys.  Restaurants seek 
only a declaration from the Courts of what their legal rights are 
under the policies.9 
 
9 In rejecting the argument that Restaurants’ complaints seek 
only legal relief, we also reject Motorists’s argument in the 





AmGUARD takes a slightly different tack from Motorists 
by arguing that, first, INC could have brought a breach of 
contract claim instead of a declaratory judgment claim, and, 
second, INC’s decision to instead bring a declaratory judgment 
action is artful pleading to avoid federal jurisdiction that should 
not be countenanced by a federal court.  One problem for 
AmGUARD’s argument is that there is nothing in the record 
evidencing that AmGUARD disclaimed coverage under its 
policy with INC, which would be a prerequisite for INC’s 
bringing a breach of contract claim in the first place.10 
The more fundamental flaw, however, is that, in 
determining whether the DJA applies, it is irrelevant whether a 
plaintiff could have sought legal relief as well.  Declaratory 
relief is often not the sole relief available.  The DJA explicitly 
accounts for the possibility of related non-declaratory relief by 
authorizing federal courts to grant declaratory relief “whether 
or not further relief is or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2201(a).  Furthermore, unlike other actions, a plaintiff 
seeking only a declaratory judgment is not forced to bring 
every claim arising out of the same circumstances or risk 
having those claims foreclosed in future actions.  The normal 
anti-claim-splitting rules of merger and bar do not apply to 
declaratory judgment actions.  See Restatement (Second) of 
 
10 Another problem for AmGUARD is that it might have 
forfeited this argument by not raising it in the District Court.  
INC, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 333 (“Importantly, it is undisputed, 
here, that Plaintiff seeks only declaratory relief under the 
DJA.”).  Because we conclude that INC’s complaint is not 
“masquerading,” we need not resolve the effect of 




Judgments § 33 cmt. c (1982) (“The effect of such a 
declaration, . . . is not to merge a claim in the judgment or to 
bar it. Accordingly, regardless of outcome, the plaintiff or 
defendant may pursue further declaratory or coercive relief in 
a subsequent action. . . . [I]f the claim has already accrued, 
refusal of bar or merger effects permits a claim to be split.”); 
Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Van Impe, 787 F.2d 163, 166 
(3d Cir. 1986), as amended (May 20, 1986) (“The language of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act itself indicates that a declaration 
as to the rights and obligations of the parties is not res judicata 
of a subsequent action for damages.” (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2202)). 
The possibility that a plaintiff could seek other, non-
declaratory forms of relief remains irrelevant to the 
applicability of the DJA regardless of the plaintiff’s motive for 
choosing to bring a declaratory judgment action.  Here, 
Restaurants want to remain in state court11 (and eventually 
recover money from their Insurers) and Insurers want to be in 
federal court (and do not want to pay out).  It is certainly 
plausible that Restaurants brought declaratory judgment 
 
11 At oral argument, counsel for INC began by expressing 
ambivalence as to the outcome of AmGUARD’s appeal, i.e., 
whether INC’s declaratory judgment action is heard in state 
court or federal court.  See Oral Arg. Recording at 26:58–27:33 
(“Sometimes I wonder when I’m preparing for this argument 
whether I want to win or I want to lose. Judge [Douglas H.] 
Hurd in Mercer County has literally granted each and every 
motion to dismiss. . . . So why [counsel for Insurers] want to 
be in the Third Circuit, I have no idea.”). This was a 




actions instead of breach of contract claims solely to avoid 
falling within a district court’s “virtually unflagging” 
obligation to exercise diversity jurisdiction.  But if so, what 
difference? 
Insurers analogize this tactic to a plaintiff’s attempt to 
fraudulently join a forum defendant in order to avoid diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  See generally Miss. ex 
rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 571 U.S. 161, 174 (2014); In 
re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 215–16 (3d Cir. 2006).  But unlike a 
plaintiff’s inclusion of a defendant whom the plaintiff has no 
true desire to proceed against, there is nothing remotely 
fraudulent here.  The plaintiff, as master of the complaint, may 
make a genuine choice to limit the relief sought.  A more apt 
analogy would be a plaintiff who decides to limit his or her 
damages claim to an amount below the amount-in-controversy 
threshold in order to avoid removal based on diversity 
jurisdiction—a long-accepted practice.  See, e.g., St. Paul 
Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938) 
(“If [the plaintiff] does not desire to try his case in the federal 
court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than the 
jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled 
to more, the defendant cannot remove.”); Morgan v. Gay, 471 
F.3d 469, 474–75 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying same principle to 
removal under Class Action Fairness Act). 
Lastly, Insurers suggest that Restaurants’ sought-after 
declaratory relief is simply a masquerade because such relief 
would not be used to guide future conduct—it would only 
establish liability for past coverage denials.  This argument 
also fails.  For one thing, at the time each complaint was filed 




three restaurants were still in effect.  For another, we held in 
Reifer that the DJA applied to the plaintiff’s declaratory 
judgment action notwithstanding the insurer’s argument that 
“the declaratory judgment action was not prospective.”  751 
F.3d at 135. 
Once again (or thrice), we reject an insurer’s argument that 
the DJA does not apply to a declaratory judgment action.  
Because we cannot prove a negative, we cannot completely 
foreclose the possibility that “[i]t may, in some circumstances, 
be possible for a party’s claim for legal relief to masquerade as 
a declaratory judgment, improperly activating discretionary 
jurisdiction.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 137.  But, for the reasons 
stated above, we discern no such circumstances here. 
B. Discretion to Abstain Under the DJA  
All three district courts declined to exercise jurisdiction 
under the DJA because each determined that one or more of 
the factors enumerated in Reifer outweighed the absence of 
parallel state proceedings.  The District Courts also considered 
Summy’s additional guidance regarding the unsettled nature of 
state law, but did so under the label of the third Reifer factor 
and its reference to “the public interest.”  Cf. Kelly, 868 F.3d 
at 288 n.13 (noting that district court considered state interest 
in interpreting unsettled state law in relation to third factor).  
Because the Courts’ analyses of the Reifer factors overlap 
significantly, our discussion below will be grouped by Reifer 
factor rather than set forth by individual appeal.  We will 
similarly address the unsettled nature of state law under the 





1. First factor: “likelihood that a federal court declaration 
will resolve the uncertainty of obligation which gave 
rise to the controversy” 
The Umami and DiAnoia’s District Courts both concluded 
that the first Reifer factor weighed in favor of remand.  The 
Courts reasoned that any declaration by a federal court would 
not “resolve the uncertainty of obligation” because federal 
courts are limited to predicting state law and certain insurance 
issues “have not been addressed by the Commonwealth’s 
highest court.”  Umami, 2020 WL 9209275, at *2; DiAnoia’s, 
2020 WL 5051459, at *3 (quoting analysis from Umami).  That 
is a misreading of the first Reifer factor. 
The first Reifer factor is not intended to be a vehicle for 
considering the effect of a declaratory judgment on the 
development of state law.  Indeed, the earliest formulation of 
the factor drew upon an analysis of relevant considerations 
under state declaratory judgment statutes and was not specific 
to “federal court” declarations.  Compare Bituminous Coal 
Operators’ Ass’n v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 
585 F.2d 586, 596–97 & n.20 (3d Cir. 1978) (citing Note, 
Developments in the Law: Declaratory Judgments — 1941–
1949, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787, 805–17 (1949)), with United 
States v. Pa., Dep’t of Env’t Res., 923 F.2d 1071, 1075 (3d Cir. 
1991) (inserting “federal court” before “declaration”).  Instead, 
the first Reifer factor captures whether a declaration would 
bring about a “complete termination of the controversy” 
between the parties and thereby avoid duplicative, piecemeal 
litigation.  Note, supra, at 805 (cleaned up).  “There are two 
general types of situations which may make it unlikely that a 




more persons have not been joined, but have an interest in the 
outcome of the action, and (2) when one or more issues have 
not been raised, but are a part of the controversy or 
uncertainty.”  Id. at 806.   
Here, the declaratory judgment actions would bring about 
a complete termination of the parties’ disputes without 
piecemeal litigation.  See Kelly, 868 F.3d at 288 (“Declaratory 
relief by the District Court would unquestionably clarify and 
settle the dispute regarding [insurer]’s obligations under the 
insurance policy.”).  Restaurants admit as much by asserting, 
in their complaints, that a declaratory judgment will be 
sufficient to afford relief and settle their respective 
controversies.  We see no mention of any interested party that 
has not been joined, nor any predicate issue that would 
undermine the usefulness of a judgment interpreting the 
parties’ obligations under their respective insurance policies. 
The District Courts’ alternative understanding of the first 
Reifer factor would place a thumb on the scale in favor of 
abstention in the many diversity jurisdiction cases raising 
issues which have not been resolved by the relevant state’s 
highest court.  Yet even without a decision of a state’s highest 
court, it is well-established that “we can ‘garner assistance 
from the decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts 
in predicting how the state’s highest court would rule.’”  
Maynard v. Rivera, 675 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1996)).  To the 
extent that the District Courts’ treatment of the first Reifer 
factor resulted from such a paucity of authority from any 
Pennsylvania court so that predicting state law would be 




IV.B.3 that a remand is still warranted. 
The Umami and DiAnoia’s Courts erred in concluding that 
the first Reifer factor weighed in favor of remand because they 
labored under an incorrect understanding of the factor.  The 
Umami Court’s total reliance on the first factor in declining to 
exercise jurisdiction fell well short of a “rigorous” weighing of 
factors “articulated in a record sufficient to enable our abuse of 
discretion review.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 144, 146 n.22.  So we 
will vacate the order in Umami and remand for further 
proceedings. 
2. Fifth factor: “general policy of restraint when the same 
issues are pending in a state court” 
The DiAnoia’s and INC Courts concluded that the fifth 
Reifer factor weighed in favor of abstention because “[a] 
significant number of cases related to insurance coverage for 
business interruption based on COVID-19 closures are pending 
. . . in . . . state courts.”  INC, 495 F. Supp. 3d at 336; see 
DiAnoia’s, 2020 WL 5051459, at *4 (“Insurance liability 
related to the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to be the subject 
of a significant number of cases in Pennsylvania state court.” 
(quoting Greg Prosmushkin, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 151)).  This 
conclusion reflects another misunderstanding of the meaning 
of one of the Reifer factors.  The fifth factor’s “policy of 
restraint” is applicable only when the “same issues” are 
pending in state court between the same parties, not when the 
“same issues” are merely the same legal questions pending in 
any state proceeding.  See Kelly, 868 F.3d at 289 (holding fifth 
factor inapplicable where “issue of [insurer’s] obligations 




state court” and “[insurer] is not even a party in the pending 
state court action and the insurance coverage dispute cannot be 
fully resolved without [insurer]”); see also Brillhart, 316 U.S. 
at 495 (“Ordinarily it would be uneconomical as well as 
vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a declaratory 
judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court 
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, 
between the same parties.” (emphasis added)), cited by Terra 
Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1217, 1224 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (original formulation of fifth Reifer factor in this 
Court). 
Because the Reifer factors are non-exhaustive, a district 
court may still consider, when relevant, whether the same legal 
question at issue in a declaratory judgment action is at issue in 
state court proceedings between different parties.  Yet we 
question how this fact would ever militate against exercising 
jurisdiction.  At any given time, there are countless insurance 
cases pending in state courts which implicate some common 
application of state law.  Once again, “[f]ederal and state courts 
are equally capable of applying settled state law to a difficult 
set of facts.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 147.  Furthermore, it would 
undercut the policy and purpose of diversity jurisdiction—
“prevent[ion of] apprehended discrimination in state courts 
against those not citizens of the State,” Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938)—if a party were unable to seek a 
declaratory judgment in federal court because that declaration 
would require the unbiased application of a settled question of 
state law. 
To the extent the District Courts’ weighing of this factor 




and novel, we turn then to novelty. 
3. Summy and third factor: “the public interest in 
settlement of the uncertainty of obligation” 
Restaurants contend that the third Reifer factor weighs in 
favor of abstention because “there is no federal interest” in 
their claims and “[t]he decisions on insurance coverage would 
involve not only an interpretation of novel issues of state 
insurance law but also on [sic] the legal impact of 
unprecedented orders of New Jersey state officials.”  INC Br. 
21 (emphasis added).  As an initial matter, federal courts sitting 
in diversity have “the usual interest in the fair adjudication of 
legal disputes.”  Kelly, 868 F.3d at 288.   While we have 
suggested that district courts should be reluctant to exercise 
DJA jurisdiction “[w]here state law is uncertain or 
undetermined,” we have instructed district courts exercising 
discretion under the DJA to “squarely address the alleged 
novelty of . . . state law claims.”  Reifer, 751 F.3d at 148–49. 
The DiAnoia’s Court stated that the complaint presented 
“novel insurance coverage issues under Pennsylvania law” for 
which “there is not yet a body of caselaw developed by 
Pennsylvania courts due to the relative recency of the COVID-
19 pandemic.”  2020 WL 5051459, at *3.  However, instead of 
addressing what precise “novel insurance coverage issues” 
were presented, the Court simply listed insurance policy 
provisions raised in the parties’ briefing without further 
explanation: “business interruption, civil authority, extra 
expense, contamination, as well as pertinent exclusions raised 
by the defense.”  Id.  Because this mere iteration fails to 




will vacate the DiAnoia’s Court’s order declining to exercise 
jurisdiction and remand for renewed consideration of all 
relevant factors. 
The INC Court did address novelty more squarely.  After 
stating that the complaint presents “novel and important issues 
of state insurance law,” the Court identified novel issues of 1) 
whether the virus exclusion applied to INC’s asserted losses, 
2) whether the application of the virus exclusion is void as 
against public policy, 3) whether INC suffered any physical 
loss or damage from a government order, and 4) whether INC 
met the requirements for civil authority coverage under the 
policy.  495 F. Supp. 3d at 335.  To the District Court, this 
meant that one of the “key” questions was “whether Plaintiff’s 
business losses were caused by the presence of the COVID-19 
virus or, rather, caused by the Executive Orders which 
prompted the closure of Plaintiff’s restaurant.”  Id.  The Court 
continued to explain that “[i]n other words, resolution of 
Plaintiff's claim requires consideration of whether a state 
government order, which required partial closure of 
businesses, constitutes ‘loss or damage caused directly or 
indirectly’ by a virus.”  Id.  Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that “the public interest in resolving the uncertainty of 
obligation is best served by remand as it allows the New Jersey 
courts the opportunity to determine the impact of [government 
orders] on insurance coverage in the State of New Jersey.”  Id. 
at 336. 
Taking the four issues in turn, the District Court overstated 
the novelty of the first issue regarding the applicability of the 
virus exclusion.  Whichever court eventually resolves INC’s 




[government orders] on insurance coverage in the State of New 
Jersey.”  Id.  Rather, that court will be determining whether 
INC’s virus exclusion, as interpreted under principles of New 
Jersey insurance law, applies to INC’s claim of lost revenue 
due to government orders.  No party has suggested that the 
principles of insurance law that would need to be employed in 
such an interpretation are unsettled.  Indeed, the relevant 
principles of New Jersey insurance law are easily summarized 
and are likely familiar in every state: 
 “An insurance policy is a contract.”  Villa v. Short, 
947 A.2d 1217, 1222 (N.J. 2008) 
 “When interpreting an insurance policy, courts 
should give the policy’s words ‘their plain, 
ordinary meaning.’”  President v. Jenkins, 853 
A.2d 247, 254 (N.J. 2004) (quoting Zacarias v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 775 A.2d 1262, 1264 (N.J. 2001)) 
 “If the policy terms are clear, we interpret the 
policy as written and avoid writing a better 
insurance policy than the one purchased.”  Passaic 
Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 21 A.3d 1151, 1157 (N.J. 2011) 
(citing Villa, 947 A.2d at 1222) 
 “However, if the language of the policy will 
support more than one meaning, ‘courts [should] 
interpret the contract to comport with the 
reasonable expectations of the insured.’”  Sahli v. 
Woodbine Bd. of Educ., 938 A.2d 923, 930 (N.J. 
2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Zacarias, 
775 A.2d at 1264)) 




policy interpretation under New Jersey law.  But save for the 
word “virus,” even the language of the policy’s virus exclusion 
was not new to New Jersey insurance law.  Recall that the virus 
exclusion in INC’s policy provides that “[AmGUARD] will 
not pay for loss or damages caused directly or indirectly by . . 
. [a]ny virus” and that “[s]uch loss or damage is excluded 
regardless of any other cause or event that contributes 
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.”   
That last sentence of the exclusion is an “anti-concurrent 
causation” clause that has been interpreted by New Jersey 
courts in the context of other policy exclusions, like flooding.  
See, e.g., Maritime Park, LLC v. Nova Cas. Co., No. A-3554-
17T2, 2019 WL 1422918, at *5–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
Mar. 29, 2019) (unpublished) (collecting cases; affirming order 
applying anti-concurrent causation clause to exclude insured 
restaurant’s claim for lost revenue due to government order 
closing park containing restaurant because government closure 
order was partially motivated by park flooding and flood 
damage was an exclusion in restaurant’s policy).  The law on 
such “anti-concurrent causation” language was thus not novel, 
even if its application to a virus would have been. Contra 
Venezie Sporting Goods, 2020 WL 5651598, at *4 n.3 (“The 
[concurrent cause] cases offered by Defendants, however, are 
federal court cases applying Pennsylvania law in water or flood 
exclusion contexts, which is a body of case law far more 
developed than the [virus] situation presented here.”).  Thus, 
the purported novelty of the first issue does not support a 





Nor does INC’s request that the policy’s virus exclusion be 
 
12 Without ruling on the merits of INC’s claim, the existence 
of the anti-concurrent causation clause would suggest that the 
“key” question identified by the District Court—“whether 
Plaintiff’s business losses were caused by the presence of the 
COVID-19 virus or, rather, caused by the Executive Orders 
which prompted the closure of Plaintiff’s restaurant”—is not 
so important in light of the virus exclusion.  The anti-
concurrent causation language turns the exclusion inquiry into 
a question of whether the government orders themselves were 
caused by the COVID-19 virus, not whether the orders were 
the superseding cause of any loss.  See Mac Prop. Grp. LLC v. 
Selective Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. CAM L 002629-20, 2020 
WL 7422374, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Nov. 5, 2020) 
(granting motion to dismiss; holding that because of anti-
concurrent causation provision, “[i]t therefore does not matter 
whether the closure of plaintiff’s business as a result of 
governmental orders to prevent the spread of the coronavirus 
constitutes direct physical damage to covered property, nor 
whether civil authority coverage can be triggered, since the 
reason for the exercise of that civil authority was the virus”); 
cf. Atwells Realty Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., C.A. No. PC-
2020-04607, 2021 R.I. Super. LEXIS 49, at *33–34 (June 4, 
2021) (denying in part motion to dismiss and applying Rhode 
Island law; holding that virus exclusion that lacked anti-
concurrent causation language—while other exclusions in 
policy used such language—did not foreclose plaintiff at 
motion-to-dismiss stage from making claim that government 




declared void as against public policy weigh in favor of 
abstention.  It is, generally, of no moment that a federal court 
is being asked to apply state public policy.  Indeed, “[t]he 
essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal court enforces 
State law and State policy.”  Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. 
Smith., 170 F.2d 44, 53 (3d Cir. 1948) (quoting Angel v. 
Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191 (1947)).  As we stated in Reifer, 
“[f]ederal courts are, of course, perfectly capable of applying 
state law, even where nonfrivolous arguments are raised to 
change it.”  751 F.3d at 149.  INC does not suggest that federal 
courts are incapable of declaring an insurance provision void 
as against New Jersey public policy or that they are somehow 
unequipped to properly consider arguments for or against 
recognizing a provision as such. 
It is true that in Reifer we affirmed a district court’s 
abstention under the DJA because the plaintiff in her state-
court complaint had made an argument, based at least in part 
on public policy, for “carving an exception to governing 
Pennsylvania law.”  Id. at 148–49.  In concluding that her 
argument was “best decided in the state court system” we 
deemed it “important[]” that the plaintiff’s argument 
“implicate[d] the policies underlying Pennsylvania’s rules 
governing attorney conduct, which are promulgated by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.”  Id. at 149.  “[B]ecause [her 
argument] directly raise[d] a matter peculiarly within the 
purview of [Pennsylvania’s] highest court,” we thought it was 
“best decided in the Pennsylvania court system.”  Id. (emphasis 
added). 
Although INC has not articulated what public policy 




exclusion clause, any argument INC might posit would not be 
peculiarly within the purview of New Jersey’s court system.  
The highest courts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania both have 
“exclusive” authority to regulate the bar in their respective 
jurisdictions, but they do not have the same regulatory 
authority over public health, or insurance generally.  See, e.g., 
GE Cap. Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. N.J. Title Ins. Co., 754 A.2d 
558, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (“Under our State 
Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with exclusive 
authority over the regulation of the Bar.” (citing N.J. Const. art. 
VI, § 2, ¶ 3)); Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1090 (Pa. 
2007) (citing Pa. Const. art. V, § 10(c)).  
It is of no significance to this case “that insurance coverage 
is a creation of state law, with policy language and premium 
rates being approved” by a state’s insurance regulator.  
DiAnoia’s, 2020 WL 5051459, at *4.  After parties enter into 
an insurance policy with language approved by a state’s 
regulator, it is unclear what special call that regulator or that 
state’s court system has to weigh any public policy arguments 
implicated by disputes over that policy’s terms.13  “An 
insurance policy is a contract” interpreted by courts, Villa, 947 
A.2d at 1222, and sister-state courts and federal courts are 
equally capable of applying state contract law.  That includes 
state contract law on public policy exceptions.  If New Jersey’s 
 
13 Any argument that New Jersey’s courts or its insurance 
regulator have a special connection to disputes over policy 
language is especially weak in this case.  The virus exclusion 
in INC’s policy with AmGUARD (under New Jersey law) is 
identical to the one contained in Umami’s policy with 




courts were also tasked with issuing public health orders that 
are implicated by virus exclusion clauses, like the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and its exclusive authority over 
the Rules of Professional Conduct in Reifer, then that could be 
considered by a federal court when declining to exercise 
jurisdiction over an insurance dispute.  Given the lack of any 
such public health authority, the issue of a virus exclusion 
being void as against public policy is not “peculiarly within the 
purview” of the state courts so as to weigh in favor of 
abstention. 
Aside from the two virus exclusion issues, the INC Court 
identified two other issues as unsettled under state law: 
whether INC suffered any physical loss or damage from a 
government order, and whether INC met the requirements for 
civil authority coverage under the policy.  It is possible that one 
or both of these issues were unsettled at the time of remand.14  
 
14 In analyzing the fifth Reifer factor, the District Court stated 
that “the law on this issue remains unsettled.” INC, 495 F. 
Supp. 3d at 336.  It did not identify the state law issue to which 
it referred.  Yet, the Court went on to quote a hearing at which 
a New Jersey state court judge, in denying an insurer’s motion 
to dismiss, determined that “there is limited legal authority in 
the State of New Jersey addressing this issue.”  Id. (citing 
Optical Servs., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1782, at *24).  
As the New Jersey court used the term, “this issue” was 
whether “plaintiffs’ loss of use of their respective properties 
[by operation of the Governor’s executive order] . . . 
constitute[s] a [‘]direct physical loss[’]” under the policy.  
Optical Servs., 2020 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1782, at *23–




However, because the District Court concluded that the third 
Reifer factor weighed in favor of abstention, in part, because 
of the virus exclusion issues, we will vacate the Court’s order 
in INC and remand for further proceedings.  On remand, the 
Court should give renewed and rigorous consideration to all 
relevant factors15 to determine whether they outweigh the lack 
of parallel state proceedings and continue to squarely address 
any alleged novelty of state law issues. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Courts all correctly rejected Insurers’ 
 
virus exclusion because the parties agreed that the relevant 
policy’s virus contamination exclusion did not apply.  Id. at 
*7–8.   
15 The metaphorical “forest” in these COVID times, Diss. Op. 
at 3, 6, consists of similarly metaphorical “trees”—cases filed 
in the district courts of the Third Circuit—which cannot make 
their way to trial because of the pandemic.  We judicially note 
that all vicinages within our circuit have been unable to 
conduct more than the occasional trial since March of 2020.  
And when pandemic and related conditions actually permit a 
trial to go forward, the district court clerk’s office can 
administratively support only one or two trials at a time, no 
matter how many judges are stationed in a particular 
courthouse.  So what judges have been doing is conscientiously 
deciding motions—which is what they have done here.  We are 
confident that the District Judges proceeding in these matters 
we now consider will take on the issues remanded to them with 





contention that Restaurants’ complaints here were for legal 
relief “masquerading” as declaratory relief.  But in weighing 
factors relevant to the exercise of discretion under the DJA, the 
Courts either misinterpreted certain Reifer factors, failed to 
squarely address the alleged novelty of state law issues, or did 
not create a record sufficient to enable us to effectively conduct 
abuse of discretion review.  We will vacate the orders on appeal 
and remand for renewed consideration under the DJA and the 
Reifer factors as clarified by this opinion. 
 
1 
DiAnoia’s Eatery, LLC, v. Motorists Insurance Company; 
Umami Pittsburgh, LLC, v. Motorists Insurance Company; 
Mark Daniel Hospitality LLC, d/b/a INC v. AmGuard 
Insurance Company 
 




ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
The COVID-19 global pandemic and resulting 
government stay-at-home orders have presented significant 
economic impacts on state institutions nationwide.  Businesses 
across the nation were not able to access and use their premises 
for over a year and have sustained substantial income losses as a 
result.  The District Courts found that these cases, which 
resulted from the pandemic, raised novel and important public 
policy issues that uniquely affect the states and, for these 
reasons, concluded that these cases should be decided in the 
first instance by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the 
State of New Jersey through their own courts.  I agree.  
 
However, the Majority has determined that the District 
Courts erred because they did not sufficiently consider the 
relevant Reifer factors.  But Reifer is not exhaustive.  
Therefore, even if the District Courts’ analysis of some Reifer 
factors was deficient, there is no need for renewed 
consideration of those factors in view of alternative 
considerations that justify the District Courts’ decisions to 




Moreover, these issues need to be decided.  Sending 
these cases back to the District Courts for further investigation 
of the Reifer factors will have the unfortunate result of delaying 
for months, if not for years, decisions on this important issue 
of insurance law.  I believe that it is vital in these cases to 
obtain, as soon as we can, court decisions on the validity of 
these insurance policy exclusions. 
 
  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I.  
Our Circuit divides declaratory judgment cases into two 
categories:  those with independent legal claims, and those 
without.1  Cases that only involve declaratory claims confer 
broader discretion on district courts to decline hearing those 
claims.2  As the Majority correctly concludes, the cases here 
involve only declaratory claims.  In this category of cases, our 
precedents “counsel hesitation by federal courts in exercising 
jurisdiction [] where the state law involved is close or 
unsettled.”3 Yet the Majority wants to restrict the District 
Courts’ broad discretion to abstain in these kinds of cases by 
requiring an overly technical application of this Court’s 
decision in Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp.,4 that overrides other 
relevant considerations.   
 
1 See Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F. 3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 
2017) (defining independent legal claims); State Auto Ins. Cos. v. 
Summy, 234 F. 3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2000) (distinguishing cases 
without independent legal claims). 
2 Summy, 234 F. 3d at 134. 
3 Id. at 135. 
4 751 F. 3d 129, 141 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 
3 
In Reifer, our Court instructed district courts to give 
“meaningful consideration to the following factors to the 
extent they are relevant”: 
 
(1) the likelihood that a federal court 
declaration will resolve the uncertainty of 
obligation which gave rise to the 
controversy; 
(2) the convenience of the parties; 
(3) the public interest in settlement of the 
uncertainty of obligation; 
(4) the availability and relative 
convenience of other remedies; 
(5) a general policy of restraint when the 
same issues are pending in a state court; 
(6) avoidance of duplicative litigation; 
(7) prevention of the use of the 
declaratory action as a method of 
procedural fencing or as a means to 
provide another forum in a race for res 
judicata; and 
(8) (in the insurance context), an inherent 
conflict of interest between an insurer's 
duty to defend in a state court and its 
attempt to characterize that suit in federal 
court as falling within the scope of a 
policy exclusion.5 
 
That said, Reifer emphasized that these factors “are non-
exhaustive, and [sometimes] district courts must consult and 
 
5 Reifer, 751 F.3d at 146. 
 
4 
address other relevant caselaw or considerations.”6  
Nevertheless, the Majority’s decision here treats the Reifer 
factors like they are exhaustive and override any other relevant 
considerations.  The result is that the Majority’s opinion misses 
the forest for the trees. 
 
In concluding that the District Courts erred in weighing 
the third Reifer factor, the Majority finds that the states’ 
interests in making their own policy decisions are “of no 
moment” because it is not within the purview of state courts to 
determine public health policy.  Yet this finding ignores the 
Supreme Court’s holding that, even in cases involving 
independent claims over which federal courts have a virtually 
unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdiction, remand under 
the DJA is appropriate “where there have been presented 
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of 
substantial public import whose importance transcends the 
case then at bar.”7  The Court has further noted that “the state 
question itself need not be determinative of state policy. It is 
enough that exercise of federal review of the question in a case 
and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to 
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of 
substantial public concern.”8     
 
The legal issues presented here implicate difficult 
questions bearing on state policy problems that are of 
substantial public import.  The unguided declarations of federal 
courts are likely to disrupt each state’s development of a 
coherent policy governing its economic recovery from the 
 
6 Id.  
7 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 814 




pandemic.  At least one of these Plaintiffs has specifically 
alleged that the application of virus-related provisions in their 
insurance contracts are void as against New Jersey public 
policy.9  That difficult issue implicates both moral and 
economic decisions about how each state wants to treat 
thousands of businesses operating in their borders. 
 
What is more, any decision in these cases will likely yield 
sweeping consequences for each state’s economy.  On one hand, 
a decision favoring the insurers will be catastrophic for many 
businesses in the hospitality and entertainment industries that 
were forced to shut down.  The fallout to follow from the 
closure of these businesses is likely to wreak havoc on each 
state’s economy; for example, business closures will likely 
raise the state’s unemployment rates, increasing the strain on 
each state’s budget as a result of an accompanying rise in 
unemployment claims.  On the other hand, a decision favoring 
the insureds places the insurance industry in a position to 
provide coverage for unimaginable losses caused by a global 
pandemic that could force these companies into bankruptcy, 
creating ripple effects for other insureds seeking coverage from 
these insurance companies for unrelated losses.  
 
Regardless of the actual outcome in these cases, the 
consequences for the states are sweeping and there is an 
obvious need for each state to step in and develop a coherent 
policy to manage its own economic recovery from the COVID-
19 pandemic and potential fallout.  Yet, in the face of these 
sweeping consequences and unique set of circumstances, the 
Majority employs a hyper-technical interpretation of the third 
Reifer factor to conclude that the District Courts erred.  
 
9 AmGuard’s Appx. 25. 
 
6 
Although our decision in Reifer found remand particularly 
appropriate because Reifer raised non-frivolous policy 
arguments involving Pennsylvania’s rules governing attorney 
conduct that were “peculiarly within the purview of that state’s 
highest court,”10 that is not the only circumstance in which 
remand based on public policy is appropriate.  The Supreme 
Court has made this clear.11   
 
Next, the Majority finds that the fifth Reifer factor only 
applies when the issues pending in state court involve the same 
parties.  The Majority raises a concern that the District Courts 
had found that “there are countless insurance cases pending in 
state courts which implicate some common application of state 
law.”12  The Majority also finds that the “District Courts’ 
alternative understanding of the first Reifer factor would place 
a thumb on the scale in favor of abstention in the many 
diversity jurisdiction cases raising issues which have not been 
resolved by the relevant state’s highest court.”13  These 
conclusions also miss the forest for the trees.  
 
First, these cases do not involve “application of a settled 
question of state law.”  These cases are deeply tied to state 
public policy and the application of COVID-specific public 
policy issues relating to insurance contract interpretation.  
Again, those issues are novel and involve some of the most 
substantial policy questions of the last century. 
 
 
10 Reifer, 751 F.3d at 149. 
11 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814. 
12 Maj. at 32. 
13 Maj. at 30. 
 
7 
Second, we have never held that parallel state 
proceedings are irrelevant just because they involve different 
parties.  It is true, as the Majority states, that the presence of 
state proceedings involving similar issues among different 
parties normally would not militate against exercising federal 
jurisdiction in insurance coverage cases.  Certainly, federal 
courts should not abstain just because there is unrelated state-
court litigation involving an insurance provision similar to the 
provision being litigated in federal court.  But these are not the 
run-of-the-mill insurance coverage cases involving merely 
similar contract provisions to those being litigated in state 
courts:  They involve the application of those contract 
provisions to claims for direct and indirect losses caused by a 
global pandemic that implicate novel and significant state 
policies.  As explained above, there is undoubtedly a public 
interest in deciding whether the application of virus exclusion 
provisions to losses arising from the COVID-19 pandemic are 
void as against state public policy governing the economic 
recovery from the pandemic; these are questions that should be 
left to the states to decide in the first instance.   
 
Finally, our Court has held that “we can garner 
assistance from the decisions of the state’s intermediate 
appellate courts in predicting how the state’s highest court 
would rule.”14  But in the absence of guidance from any 
intermediate state court that can help predict how they would 
address difficult questions of state law bearing on a novel and 
important public policy problem, federal courts ought to 
 
14 Maynard v. Rivera, 675 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1996)).   
 
8 
abstain from making an Erie guess.15  That is exactly what the 
District Courts correctly did here.   
 
We lack any guidance to predict how each state’s 
highest court would rule.16  Therefore, cases among similarly 
situated parties pending in the state system will likely supply 
the necessary guidance for federal courts in resolving these 
issues.  Indeed, the cases pending in state courts involve 
substantially similar, difficult issues of state law “bearing on 
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance 
transcends” that of the cases at bar.17 Although an Erie guess 
in these cases might resolve the uncertainty in the obligations 
of those at bar, it will undoubtedly create additional uncertainty 
for parties that are similarly situated by potentially upending 
the uniformity of outcomes between state and federal courts.  
Such a result flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s 
instruction to federal courts on how to proceed when asked to 
resolve novel or difficult questions of state law that involve 
public policy problems of substantial public import, policies 
 
15 Summy, 234 F.3d at 135 (“[I]t is counterproductive for a district 
court to entertain jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action 
that implicates unsettled questions of state law, questions which 
might otherwise be candidates for certification to the state's highest 
court. Such matters should proceed in normal fashion through the 
state court system.”). 
16 The Courts could not find any cases from intermediate state 
courts involving a similar set of circumstances that could guide 
their resolutions of the issues at bar. See Motorists’ Appx. 6, 19 
(emphasizing the lack of guidance from state courts in resolving 
these issues); AmGuard’s Appx. 12 (same). 
17 Prosmushkin, P.C. v. Hanover Insurance Group, 479 F.Supp.3d 
143, 150 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2020)(quoting Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814). 
 
9 
that transcend the importance of the cases at bar.18  It would 
also be an incentive for forum shopping between state and 
federal courts -- precisely what Reifer aimed to prevent.   
 
 Ultimately, it is the decisions issued by state courts that 
will determine other litigants’ rights and obligations regarding 
insurance coverage claims arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic, not the speculative declarations of federal courts 
predicting difficult questions of state law.  There is no reason 
why these litigants should be left in the lurch and not benefit 
from those courts’ authoritative determinations of state public 
policy.  The paucity of state court authority and the existence 
of forthcoming state-court decisions addressing these policy 
matters thus further militates against federal jurisdiction.    
Federal courts “do not establish state law, [they] are limited to 
predicting it.”19  Absent guidance from state courts on how to 
resolve these questions and given the sweeping economic 
consequences that a decision will have on the rights and 
obligations of the parties and of those similarly situated, it is 
more prudent and efficient for federal courts to abstain.20  No 




In short, the District Courts sufficiently addressed the 
factors relevant to their decisions to abstain from exercising 
jurisdiction under the DJA.  These Courts had sufficient facts 
 
18 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 814. 
19 Summy, 234 F.3d at 135. 
20 “It is not our function to find our way through a maze of local 
statutes and decisions on so technical and specialized a subject 
[matter] . . . .  For one thing, it is too easy to lose our way.” Brillhart 
v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 497 (1942). 
 
10 
on the record to support their conclusion that the matters before 
them implicate substantial questions of public policy whose 
import transcends the cases at bar.  Absent guidance from state 
courts, these questions ought to be resolved by state courts in 
the first instance and they should be decided without undue 
delay.  Even if their consideration of the Reifer factors was 
deficient—which I believe it was not—that deficiency does not 
warrant the delay for a renewed consideration of those factors 
in light of the alternative considerations that support their 
exercise of discretion.  
 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgments of the 
District Courts.  
